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Abstract
President Barack Obama and US political and policy leaders across the political spectrum
have in recent years spoken about the need to eliminate nuclear weapons because of the dangers
they pose. In 1970, the United States agreed by Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (”NPT”) to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. The International Court of Justice
(”ICJ”) in 1996 found that this is an obligation not just to begin but also to “bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international
control.” International humanitarian law (”IHL”) prohibits the use of weapons whose effects are
uncontrollable, indiscriminate, disproportionate, or unnecessary, and further prohibits a state from
threatening to use nuclear weapons that would be unlawful to use.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama and US political and policy leaders
across the political spectrum have in recent years spoken about
the need to eliminate nuclear weapons because of the dangers
they pose. In 1970, the United States agreed by Article VI of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") to negotiate nuclear
disarmament in good faith.' The International Court of Justice
("ICJ") in 1996 found that this is an obligation not just to begin
but also to "bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control."2 International humanitarian law ("IHL") 3
prohibits the use of weapons whose effects are uncontrollable,
indiscriminate, disproportionate, or unnecessary, and further
prohibits a state from threatening to use nuclear weapons that
would be unlawful to use.4
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. VI, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
2. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 1105(2) (F) (July 8).
3. The body of law applicable to the use of force in armed conflict is variously
referred to as international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, the law of war,
and jus in bello. See id. 1 75.
4. Id. It 42, 86.
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In April 2010, the Obama Administration released its
Nuclear Posture Review ("Obama NPR" or "NPR") setting forth
its view of the role of nuclear weapons in US security and its
plans for nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. The Obama
NPR proposes an ambitious Cold War-style agenda for nuclear
arms control. It is essentially a program for managing and
reducing nuclear weapons risks, including those appurtenant to
the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, the testing of such
weapons, the production of fissile materials, the declaratory
policy on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be
used, and the maintenance of strategic relationships with
potential adversaries. However, the Obama NPR is fundamentally
inconsistent with President Obama's stated objective of the
elimination of nuclear weapons and with the United States'
obligations under the NPT and IHL.
The Obama NPR portrays nuclear weapons as central to US
security and as a legitimate means for the United States to
address military concerns. It communicates to other states that it
is legitimate for states to maintain and potentially use nuclear
weapons if they see some potential advantage in doing so. It
proclaims that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated as long as
regional strife remains in the world. It eviscerates the very
concept of the elimination of nuclear weapons by portraying it as
a process whereby states continue to spend billions of dollars to
maintain physical infrastructures and personnel for the swift
resumption of production and potential use of such weapons. It
manifests no willingness to negotiate a convention or other legal
instrument for the elimination of nuclear weapons.5 It leaves the
world with nuclear weapons, the effects of which are
uncontrollable and indiscriminate and cannot be expected to
meet the legal tests of proportionality and necessity under IHL.
Because the use of these weapons would be unlawful under
international law, it is unlawful for the United States to threaten
5. The Action Plan adopted by consensus by the Parties to the 2010 NPT Review
Conference noted "the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention
or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a
strong system of verification." 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 3-28, 2010, Final Document, 1 81, U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I) (2010) [hereinafter Final Document].
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to use these weapons, whether through the practice of
deterrence or otherwise.
The nuclear policy announced by the Obama NPR is thus
inconsistent with the United States' obligation under the NPT to
negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. The use of the
nuclear weapons to be maintained in the US arsenal under the
Obama NPR would be unlawful under the law of armed conflict
in most if not all circumstances of potential use.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the
effects of nuclear weapons and the many calls in recent years
from across the political spectrum for the abolition of nuclear
weapons, including such calls by President Obama both as
presidential candidate and as president. Part II describes the
Obama NPR and the many respects in which it backs away from
the avowed objective of abolition by continuing the United
States' Cold War posture, which was premised on the putative
legitimacy of nuclear weapons and deterrence and in defiance of
international law. Part III suggests how a nuclear posture
committed to abolition and compliance with international law
might differ from the Obama NPR and highlights fundamental
inconsistencies between the NPR and the Action Plan of the 2010
NPT Conference supported by the United States.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Effects of Nuclear Weapons
The ICJ in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion
described the "unique characteristics" of nuclear weapons that
make them dangerous to world security:
The Court ... notes that nuclear weapons are explosive
devices whose energy results from the fusion or fission of the
atom. By its very nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as
they exist today, releases not only immense quantities of heat
and energy, but also powerful and prolonged radiation.
According to the material before the Court, the first two
causes of damage are vastly more powerful than the damage
caused by other weapons, while the phenomenon of
radiation is said to be peculiar to nuclear weapons. These
characteristics render the nuclear weapon potentially
catastrophic. The destructive power of nuclear weapons
2011] 737
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cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the
potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem
of the planet.
The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would
affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography
over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons
would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing
radiation has the potential to damage the future
environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause
genetic defects and illness in future generations.
In consequence,... it is imperative for the Court to take
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,
and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to
cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause
damage to generations to come.6
The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Conference ("Final
Document"), prepared with the active involvement of the United
States,7 confirmed the extreme risks presented by nuclear
weapons. The Final Document notes that there are still "several
thousands" of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled and
expressed the conference's "deep concern at the continued risk
for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons
could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
that would result from the use of nuclear weapons." 8 In the
"Action Plan" adopted by the conference, again with the active
support of the United States, the Final Document includes the
following as one of its "Principles and Objectives": "The
Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and
reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 135-36.
7. See, e.g., Laura Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament,
Remarks by the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (June 24, 2010),
available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/06/24/amb-kennedy-npt. With respect
to formation of the Final Document, Ambassador Kennedy stated:
We shared with the Chair U.S. proposals for inclusion in this final report in
the initial Committee meetings, as did the NAM and numerous other states. It
was clear from the beginning that agreement on some issues would be highly
problematic, in particular those related to a time-bound nuclear weapons
convention.
Id.
8. Final Document, supra note 5, 1 80.
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applicable international law, including international
humanitarian law."9
B. Support for Abolition
The focus in recent years on the goal of a nuclear-weapons-
free world received substantial impetus from the January 4, 2007
Wall Street Journal article, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," by
Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry, and George P.
Schultz.10 In this article, the authors concluded that the Cold War
doctrine of nuclear deterrence among the major powers has
become "obsolete" and that reliance on nuclear weapons for
deterrence was becoming "increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective.""
The authors further saw an "historic opportunity" to end
nuclear weapons as a threat to the world:
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers,
but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be
required to take the world to the next stage-to a solid
consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally
as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into
potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as
a threat to the world.12
The authors "endorse [d] setting the goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons" and set forth a number of action steps
required to achieve that goal.' 3
A year later, on January 15, 2008, Messrs. Kissinger, Nunn,
Perry, and Schultz, authored a second Wall Street Journal article,
titled "Toward A Nuclear-Free World." In this article they noted
9. Id. at 19.
10. See Henry Kissinger et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2007, at A15. Mr. Schultz was US Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was US
Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was US Secretary of State from
1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn was US Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
from 1987 to 1995.
11. Id. ("Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security
during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War
made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence
continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from
other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly
hazardous and decreasingly effective.").
12. Id.
13. Id.
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that "[t]he accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear
know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear
tipping point."' 4 They again pointed out that, with nuclear
weapons being more widely available, "deterrence is decreasingly
effective and increasingly hazardous." 5 In this second article, the
authors quoted Mikhail Gorbachev's January 2007 statement of
the central point that nuclear weapons, rather than being an aid
to security, have become a security risk: "It is becoming clearer
that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving
security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security
more precarious."16
As for how this problem may be solved, the article noted the
inevitable key role of the United States and Russia: "The U.S. and
Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear
warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience
to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join."' 7
Among the steps that the article identified that the US and Russia
could take to dramatically reduce nuclear weapons were the
following:
Take steps to increase the warning and decision times
for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby
reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks.
Reliance on launch procedures that deny command
authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent
decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's
environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare
pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if
the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons
state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers.
Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows
in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually
agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-
control sequence.18
14. Henry Kissinger et al., Toward a Nuclear-Free World, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 15, 2008, at
A13.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Mikhail Gorbachev, The Nuclear Threat, WALL ST.J., Jan. 31, 2007,
at Al3).
17. Id.
18. Id.
OBAMA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
Barack Obama, as a presidential candidate, endorsed this
objective of achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world. In a speech
on October 2, 2007, in words against which the Obama NPR
must be judged, Mr. Obama stated that the United States'
continued focus on maintaining a nuclear weapons capability
sufficient to deter the Soviet Union no longer makes sense
because the Soviet Union no longer exists:
We need to change our nuclear policy and our posture,
which is still focused on deterring the Soviet Union-a
country that doesn't exist. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan
and North Korea have joined the club of nuclear-armed
nations, and Iran is knocking on the door. More nuclear
weapons and more nuclear-armed nations mean more
danger to us all. 19
Mr. Obama, as candidate, further recognized that, unless
the United States fulfilled its obligations under the NPT to
achieve nuclear disarmament, it could not expect non-nuclear
states to fulfill their obligations under the NPT to refrain from
obtaining nuclear weapons. Mr. Obama stated:
We will not pursue unilateral disarmament. As long as
nuclear weapons exist, we'll retain a strong nuclear
deterrent. But we'll keep our commitment under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the long road towards
eliminating nuclear weapons. We'll work with Russia to take
U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert, and to
dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our nuclear weapons
and material. We'll start by seeking a global ban on the
production of fissile material for weapons. And we'll set a
goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range
missiles so that the agreement is global.
As we do this, we'll be in a better position to lead the world in
enforcing the rules of the road if we firmly abide by those rules. It's
time to stop giving countries like Iran and North Korea an excuse.
It's time for America to lead. When I'm President, we'll
strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so that
19. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator from Illinois and Democratic Candidate for U.S.
President, Speech at Depaul University (Feb. 10, 2007), (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2008/barack-obamas-foreign-policy-speech/pl4356?
breadcrumb=%2Fcampaign2008%2Fspeeches.
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nations that don't comply will automatically face strong
international sanctions. 20
Mr. Obama, upon becoming president, followed through on
his campaign promise to take an initiative with respect to nuclear
weapons. In his historic speech on April 5, 2009 in Hradcany
Square in Prague, the president stated:
The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the
most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was
fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but
generations lived with the knowledge that their world could
be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that
existed for centuries, that embodied the beauty and the
talent of so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.
Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of
those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the
threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a
nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired
these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in
nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The
technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are
determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain
these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation
regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we
could reach the point where the center cannot hold.2'
President Obama went on to point out the extreme dangers
presented by the detonation of even one nuclear weapon,
potentially affecting our "ultimate survival":
Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere.
One nuclear weapon exploded in one city-be it New York
or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris
or Prague-could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And
no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the
consequences might be-for our global safety, our security,
our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival.22
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech
Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press.office/
Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
22. Id.
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President Obama went on to set forth his belief that the
fatalism of believing that a nuclear weapons world is inevitable
must be overcome:
Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be
stopped, cannot be checked-that we are destined to live in
a world where more nations and more people possess the
ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly
adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear
weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to
ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.23
President Obama then expressed the United States'
commitment to seeking a world without nuclear weapons:
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be
reached quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take
patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the
voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to
insist, "Yes, we can."24
President Obama emphasized the "basic bargain" of the
NPT, by which, as he put it, "nuclear weapons [states] will move
toward disarmament," and "countries without nuclear weapons
will not acquire them."25 While referring to the enforcement of
the obligations of the non-nuclear states, President Obama
focused on the binding nature of the NPT commitment.
Specifically noting that weapons held in violation of a state's NPT
obligations are "illegal," President Obama stated:
Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished.
Words must mean something. The world must stand
together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the
time for a strong international response . . . and North Korea
must know that the path to security and respect will never
come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must
come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that's
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. President Obama also referenced the nuclear energy part of the "basic
bargain" of the NPT, whereby all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.
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why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the
North Koreans to change course.26
II. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
A. Process and Background
The Obama NPR states that, as mandated by Congress, it was
conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, in consultation with the secretary of state and the secretary
of energy.27 It states that the president, through presidential
guidance, called for a thorough review of US nuclear weapons
policies and force structure.28 President Obama was reportedly
involved personally in drafting and revising the NPR.2 9
Aside from references to the requirements of NPT Article
VI,3O the NPR, with one possible exception discussed below,31
does not refer to or appear to take into consideration the
requirements of international law. This a regrettable omission in
light of the clear body of international law that the United States,
in other contexts, has acknowledged to be applicable to the use
and threat of use of nuclear weapons.32
26. Id.
27. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%
20Report.pdf [hereinafter NPR].
28. Id. at 1.
29. SeeJim Hoagland, The Beginning of a Nuclear Spring, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2010,
at A15 ("President Obama was making editing changes in the Nuclear Posture Review
right up to the last minutes before it was to go to press," says William J. Perry, defense
secretary in the Clinton administration and a member of a quartet of elder statesmen
whose advocacy of nuclear disarmament has informed and influenced Obama's
thinking.").
30. See NPR, supra note 27, at 7.
31. See infra notes 102-05, and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Charles J. Moxley Jr., et al., Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 595 (2011) (discussing, inter alia, the United States' numerous
acknowledgements of the applicability of IHL to the use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons, including statements to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion and
military manuals of the US armed forces).
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B. Timeframe
The NPR focuses principally on steps to be taken in the next
five to ten years, but also considers "the path ahead for U.S.
nuclear strategy and posture over the longer term."33
C. Security Environment
The Obama NPR identifies nuclear terrorism as "today's
most immediate and extreme danger" and sees "a serious risk
that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear
weapon."34 The "other pressing threat" is nuclear proliferation,
particularly from Iran and North Korea.35 The NPR further sees a
continuing need to ensure strategic stability with potential
adversaries, particularly China and Russia.36
The NPR sets forth the following hierarchy of nuclear
concerns and strategic objectives: (1) "discouraging additional
countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities"; (2)
"stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the
materials to build them"; (3) "maintain[ing] stable strategic
relationships with Russia and China"; and (4) "counter [ing]
threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby
protecting the United States and our allies and partners against
nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they
might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents."37
The NPR does not recognize nuclear weapons themselves-
and certainly not the nuclear weapons possessed by the United
States and its allies and partners-as a significant security issue. It
does not convey the sense that nuclear weapons are in any way
excessive or of questionable legitimacy or military value.
Completely missing is the point made by Messrs. Kissinger, Nunn,
Perry, and Schultz in their 2008 Wall Street Journal article, quoting
Mikhail Gorbachev, that nuclear weapons, rather than
contributing to security, have become a security risk.38 The
Obama NPR, in this regard, seems mired in Cold War thinking.
33. NPR, supra note 27, at iv.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at v.
38. See supra notes 14-18
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D. Key Objectives
Based on the foregoing security environment, the Obama
NPR sets forth the following five key objectives of US nuclear
weapons policies and posture: (1) preventing nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of US
nuclear weapons in US national security strategy; (3) maintaining
strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
(4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies
and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal.39
The NPR does not make the elimination of nuclear weapons
a key objective. Nor does it endorse-or even reference-the
potential negotiation of a convention or other legal instrument
prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons (it does
not even reference such a binding legal process as part of the
long-term goal). The NPR's key objectives of maintaining
strategic deterrence, strengthening regional deterrence, and
sustaining an effective nuclear arsenal communicate something
far different from elimination.
E. Role of Nuclear Weapons
Noting that "[t]he massive nuclear arsenal we inherited
from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly
suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and
unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons," the Obama NPR
concluded that the US nuclear policies and posture should be
aligned "to our most urgent priorities-preventing nuclear
terrorism and nuclear proliferation."4
The question presents itself: What would it mean to align US
nuclear policies to the urgent priorities of preventing nuclear
terrorism and nuclear proliferation? Such a realignment would
seem most centrally to be achieved by making nuclear weapons
unavailable to terrorists (most effectively by eliminating such
weapons) and convincing potential proliferators that nuclear
weapons offer no net military or security benefit (most
effectively, by the United States acting on such conviction in its
own nuclear policies). It would certainly not mean maintaining
39. Id. at iii.
40. Id. at v.
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thousands of nuclear weapons at high alert and arguing that
doing so is necessary for security and is therefore legitimate.
The Obama NPR, however, states that focusing on the
priorities of preventing terrorism and proliferation does not
"mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant."41 It
goes on to say, "Indeed, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear
forces. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role
in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and
partners around the world."42
According to the NPR, the role of the US nuclear forces-
their "essential role"-is to deter "potential adversaries" and
reassure allies and partners. This sounds like the very kind of
Cold War thinking-focusing on deterring the Soviet Union and
now Russia-that Mr. Obama, as a candidate, abjured when he
said, "We need to change our nuclear policy and our posture,
which is still focused on deterring the Soviet Union-a country
that doesn't exist."43 The Obama NPR, while recognizing that the
United States' Cold War vintage nuclear arsenal is "poorly
suited" to addressing terrorism and proliferation, does not send
the message to Russia or China or any other state that the United
States is seriously interested in fundamentally changing that
arsenal or the United States' overall commitment to nuclear
weapons.
The NPR also sets forth what is ultimately a very pro-nuclear
standard regarding the size of the nuclear arsenal the United
States will retain going forward: "The United States will retain
the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need
to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise."" This seems like a
euphemistic way of saying that the United States will keep as
many nuclear weapons as it feels it needs to deter-this time it
says "adversaries," not "potential adversaries"-and to reassure
allies. From this, it can be deduced that the United States is still
embracing nuclear weapons as legitimate, lawful, and
appropriate weapons. This is a nuclear posture that tells other
44. Id.
42. Id.
43. Obama, supra note 19.
44. NPR, supra note 27, at 39.
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states that nuclear weapons are allowable, based on a state's
perception of its security needs and advantages.
Thus, while the United States is willing to cut back on its
nuclear arsenal, such cutbacks are not based on the excessiveness
or illegitimacy of the weapons and certainly not on their illegality
or a commitment to eliminate them, but rather on the sense that
the United States no longer needs as many nuclear weapons as it
previously did:
But fundamental changes in the international security
environment in recent years-including the growth of
unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major
improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold
War rivalries-enable us to fulfill those objectives at
significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced
reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without
jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance
goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies
and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet
our most pressing security challenges.45
The language, "our traditional deterrence and reassurance
goals," seems to exemplify just how steeped this NPR is in Cold
War thinking. President Obama, notwithstanding the political
goal of nuclear elimination he has projected, has not been
willing (or able) to "operationalize" the vision. Providing for the
United States to maintain its Cold War force structure of air-,
land-, and sea-based missiles,46 the Obama NPR does not
affirmatively project the notion that, since Russia is no longer an
enemy, perhaps the United States should approach the whole
issue of nuclear weapons with Russia in a different way, one more
informed by the objective of elimination than by the Cold War
instincts.
Aside from Russia, other potential adversaries have relatively
small nuclear arsenals. Reliable sources show Russia as having a
total inventory of approximately 12,000 nuclear weapons, China
240, and North Korea less than 10.47 If the United States'
45. Id. at v.
46. Id. at 19-25.
47. Hans M. Kristensen, Director, Nuclear Information Project, Presentation on
Policy Responses to Nuclear Threats: Nuclear Posturing after the Cold War (Nov. 4,
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publicationsl/Brief2l
NewMexico110410.pdf.
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relationship with Russia could be more deeply reconceptualized
and reconfigured, it seems evident that the two countries'
arsenals could be reduced much more quickly as part of a
process of nuclear elimination.
Also, while the NPR's focus on arms control with Russia is
understandable, its failure to embrace such a process with other
nuclear weapons states risks sacrificing broader support that
might be developed for arms control and abolition. The absence
of such a broader effort also undermines the sense that the
Obama NPR is genuinely committed to nuclear elimination.
F. Deterrence and Possible Use
Regarding the continuing role of nuclear weapons, the
Obama NPR further states:
The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
and U.S. military strategy has been reduced significantly in
recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at
this time.
The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which
will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter
nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.
During the Cold War, the United States reserved the
right to use nuclear weapons in response to a massive
conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies. Moreover, after the United States gave up its own
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) pursuant to
international treaties (while some states continue to possess
or pursue them), it reserved the right to employ nuclear
weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its
allies and partners.
Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation
has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S.
conventional military preeminence and continued
improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to
counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S.
nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks-
conventional, biological, or chemical-has declined
significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.
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To that end, the United States is now prepared to
strengthen its long-standing "negative security assurance" by
declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that
are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations.48
As for the limits of its negative security assurance, the NPR
states:
In the case of countries not covered by this assurance-
states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations-there remains a narrow range of contingencies
in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in
deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United
States or its allies and partners. The United States is
therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a
universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole
purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish
conditions under which such a policy could be safely
adopted.49
Most striking in this position of the NPR regarding the
circumstances in which the United States might potentially use
nuclear weapons is the extent to which the United States' basic
posture as to these weapons remains unchanged,
notwithstanding the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the
Cold War. During the Cold War, the US deterrence policy was
addressed primarily against the Soviet Union's potential use of
not only nuclear but also of conventional, chemical, and
biological weapons. Today's US policy is the same:
notwithstanding its negative security assurance forswearing use of
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in
compliance with their NPT obligations, the Obama NPR
continues to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against Russia's
use of not only nuclear but also of conventional, chemical, and
biological weapons. Paradoxically, the Obama NPR's doggedly
persistent adherence to Cold War policy is not even in the
United States' interest because, contrary to the Cold War reality,
the United States now has a far stronger conventional weapons
48. NPR, supra note 27, at vii-viii.
49. Id. at viii.
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capability than Russia. The Obama NPR ignores candidate
Obama's recognition that it makes no sense for the United States
to still base its nuclear policy and posture on deterring Russia.
As to the circumstances in which the United States might
use nuclear weapons, the NPR states:
Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use
nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new
assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United
States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. It
is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the
nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended
forever.50
Again, it seems evident that the approach of the Obama
NPR is that the use of nuclear weapons is perfectly fine and
legitimate in extreme circumstances where the United States
could not defend its vital interests-as it perceives them-
through the use of conventional weapons. How could this not
signal to other states that their use of nuclear weapons is
perfectly fine and legitimate when their vital interests-as they
perceive them-can be served by the use of such weapons? This
commitment by the Obama NPR to the usability of nuclear
weapons seems devoid of any sense of the excessiveness or
illegitimacy and certainly of the potential illegality of such
weapons. In a practical sense, the Obama NPR legitimizes
nuclear weapons use by all states, based on subjective standards-
and does so without any consideration whatsoever of the
requirements of international law.
The implications of the US position that the use of nuclear
weapons is permissible, based on subjective standards, to defend
vital interests are far reaching. As the Obama NPR notes, " [T] he
United States today has the strongest conventional military forces
in the world. Our close allies and partners field much of the rest
of the world's military power."51 Other states may conclude that,
if the United States, with its overwhelming conventional weapons
capability, still feels it needs nuclear weapons, then they, with
50. Id. at viii-ix.
51. Id. at 45.
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their far weaker conventional weapons capabilities, have all the
more need for such weapons.
The NPR's "strengthen [ing]" of the United States' negative
security assurances, "declaring that the United States will not use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons
states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their
nuclear non-proliferation obligations,"5 2 ostensibly raises the
threshold for the potential use of nuclear weapons. However, the
NPR does not provide any objective criteria on what constitutes
compliance with a state's nuclear nonproliferation obligations,
nor does it establish materiality requirements as to levels of
noncompliance. Unfortunately, the ambiguity of this part of the
declaration and apparent subjectivity of the underlying
determination renders the meaning of the declaration uncertain.
While uncertainty and ambiguity can be viewed as enhancing
deterrence, the resultant ambiguity can also increase the risks of
use.
The Final Document recommends that assurances to non-
nuclear states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them
be clarified, pursuant to "effective international arrangements,"
including perhaps "an internationally legally binding
instrument."53 The NPR does not address formalization of the
United States negative security assurances in this regard,
resulting in a situation in which these assurances are of uncertain
or at least debatable legal effect and, at least as a practical matter,
could ostensibly be changed unilaterally by the United States at
any time.54
It also must be recognized that the US deterrence policy is,
by its nature, broadly, vaguely, and, often, inconsistently
articulated: in a broad but real sense it is simply the threat that
the United States has these weapons and may use them if it
decides to do so in a particular circumstance. This ambiguity
flows in significant part from the wide range of ways of evaluating
what is a "vital interest" at a given moment. Nor is it evident that
the negative security assurances referenced by the NPR are a
52. Id. at viii.
53. Final Document, supra note 5, at 22.
54. See John Burroughs, The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and International Law, 22
MICH. INT'L. LAw., Summer 2010, at 2, 6-7 n.16 and accompanying text (arguing that
certain of the United States' negative security assurances are legally binding).
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meaningful part of the US policy of deterrence or integrated into
its contingent war plans.
Also notable is the NPR's repeated statement that the
United States will continue to hold and potentially use nuclear
weapons "as long as nuclear weapons exist."55 Standing alone,
this might seem to be merely a statement of reality. However,
given the NPR's focus on the continued importance of nuclear
weapons to US security for the indefinite future, this statement
seems fundamentally to embrace the existence of such weapons.
G. Arms Control
The NPR identifies arms control and limitation steps
designed "to bring our nuclear weapons policies and force
posture into better alignment with today's national security
priorities,"56 including:
Pursue rigorous measures to reinvigorate the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the broader non-
proliferation regime, and secure vulnerable nuclear
materials worldwide against theft or seizure by terrorists;
Seek ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and prompt commencement of
negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
Increase efforts to improve nuclear forensics to attribute the
source of any covert nuclear attack, so that the United States
can hold accountable any state, terrorist group, or other
non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to
obtain or use nuclear weapons;
Adopt a strengthened "negative security assurance"
declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that
are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations;
Seek ratification and implementation of the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) requiring substantial
reductions in deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces;
Structure the reduced U.S. force in a way that promotes
stability, including "de- MIRVing" U.S. ICBMs;
55. NPR, supra note 27, at iii, v, vii, 1, 6, 15, 40, 47.
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Eliminate the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched
cruise missile (TLAM-N);
Strengthen regional security architectures and reinforce
security commitments to allies and partners by maintaining
an effective nuclear umbrella while placing increased
reliance on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities (e.g., missile
defenses and conventional long-range missiles);
Work with NATO Allies on a new Strategic Concept that
supports Alliance cohesion and sustains effective extended
deterrence, while reflecting the role of nuclear weapons in
supporting Alliance strategy in the 21st century;
Pursue high-level dialogues with Russia and China to
promote more stable, transparent, and non-threatening
strategic relationships between those countries and the
United States;
Continue to posture U.S. forces and enhance command and
control arrangements to reduce further the possibility of
nuclear weapons launches resulting from accidents,
unauthorized actions, or misperceptions and to maximize
the time available to the President to consider whether to
authorize the use of nuclear weapons;
Implement well-funded stockpile management and
infrastructure investment plans that can sustain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at significantly reduced
stockpile levels without nuclear testing or the development
of new nuclear warheads;
Complete the Presidentially-directed review of post-New
START arms control objectives, to establish goals for future
reductions in nuclear weapons, as well as evaluating
additional options to increase warning and decision time,
and to further reduce the risks of false warning or
misjudgments relating to nuclear use; and
Initiate a comprehensive national research and development
program to support continued progress toward a world free
of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on
verification technologies.5 7
Many of these measures have the potential to significantly
reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons and could
indeed be significant steps on the road to the elimination of
57. Id. at 46-47.
OBAMA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
nuclear weapons. However, others of them seem designed to
foster the United States' long-term, continued reliance on
nuclear weapons. Still others of them seem to gloss over the real
issues.
A significant initiative is pursuing high-level dialogues with
Russia and China. What is missing is an initiative for proposing
nuclear disarmament to Russia and China, seeking to persuade
them of the reasons for such disarmament and to engage them in
the actual process. Another initiative of the NPR that falls short is
implementing stockpile management and infrastructure
investment plans that can sustain an effective nuclear arsenal;
"sustaining an effective nuclear arsenal" is a far cry from
eliminating the arsenal. The same seems true for the initiative of
working with NATO allies to support alliance cohesion and to
sustain effective extended deterrence; "sustaining effective
extended deterrence" is quite different from eliminating nuclear
weapons. Similar questions are raised by the goal of
strengthening regional security and reinforcing security
commitments by maintaining an effective nuclear umbrella;
maintaining "an effective nuclear umbrella" is quite different
from eliminating nuclear weapons. Finally, the initiative about
structuring a reduced US force seems incomplete. The NPR does
not explore whether there might be a way, in connection with
potential parallel actions with Russia and China, to structure the
US and other nuclear forces in ways that could be conducive to
the gradual build-down of such forces as part of a process of
nuclear elimination. The foregoing suggests that nuclear
weapons are a status quo that will continue for the indefinite
future.
H. Failure of the NPR to Change the United States'Fundamental
Nuclear Posture
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen described the
contemporary composition of the US nuclear arsenal:
The requirement for this many weapons arises from the
Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, signed by then-
defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld in 2004, which states in
part: "U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to
be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-
supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy
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leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its
own objectives in a post-war world." The most recent military
translation of this guidance is Operations Plan (OPLAN)
8010-08 Global Deterrence and Strike, a new strategic war
plan put into effect on February 1, 2008. This plan differs
significantly from the Cold War-era Single Integrated
Operational Plan by including a more diverse "family of
plans applicable in a wider range of scenarios" that were first
developed for the previous plan, OPLAN 8044 Revision 05,
in October 2004. The family of plans is meant to provide
national command authorities with "more flexible options to
assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat
adversaries in a wider range of contingencies." OPLAN 8010
also includes a series of executable, scenario-based strike
options, first created in 2003, against regional states with
weapons of mass destruction programs, including North
Korea and Iran.58
They go on to explain that a change in the US nuclear force
structure would be necessary to further reduce the size of the US
nuclear arsenal:
To achieve further significant reductions-down to say
1,000-1,500 warheads-U.S. nuclear force structure will have
to change, as will the guidance that sets out the role of
nuclear weapons. This size arsenal would not support a war
plan that requires the military to hold at risk all forms of
weapons of mass destruction targets; command and control
facilities; political and military leadership; and the war-
making industries of Russia, China, and a handful of
regional states. It would also make it excessive and too
expensive to maintain a triad of sea-, land-, and air-based
delivery platforms. It will be a formidable challenge, even for
a committed executive branch, to bring about the necessary
alterations within the military services and combatant
commands and gain congressional approval for these
changes. Achieving the larger goal of global nuclear
disarmament will require other nuclear weapon states to
reduce their arsenals as well, an additional hurdle. 59
58. Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces,
2009, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 59, 60 (internal citations
omitted).
59. Id. at 60-62 (internal citations omitted).
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The Obama NPR does not appear to have changed the
posture of the US nuclear forces to allow the numbers to go to
the 1000 to 1500 range. The NPR does not reference OP[AN
8010 Global Deterrence and Strike, which appears to still be in
effect.6o It will be interesting to see what the Obama
Administration does with OPIAN 8010.
I. Modernization
The Obama NPR not only suggests that the United States
will maintain a robust nuclear weapons capability, but it also
makes a substantial commitment to continue and modernize this
capability:
In order to sustain a safe, secure, and effective U.S.
nuclear stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States must possess a modern physical
infrastructure-comprised of the national security
laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities-and a
highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed
to sustain the nuclear deterrent and support the President's
nuclear security agenda.6'
The NPR heralds in stirring terms the need to upgrade the
US nuclear infrastructure and attract the best and the brightest
scientists and engineers to work in this area, which the NPR
laments has fallen into disfavor among scientists. 62 The NPR
portrays the US development of a "revitalized" nuclear weapons
complex as, in effect, a deterrent against the nuclear aspirations
of other states63 :
[Increased investments in the nuclear infrastructure and
a highly skilled workforce], over time, can reduce our
reliance on large inventories of non-deployed warheads to
deal with technical surprise, thereby allowing additional
reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile and supporting our
long-term path to zero. A revitalized infrastructure will also
60. Hans M. Kristensen et al., From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear
Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons 11 (Fed'n of Am. Scientists & The
Natural Resources Def. Council, Occasional Paper No. 7, 2009), available at http://
www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf [hereinafter Kristensen, Counterforce];
see also Norris & Kristensen, supra note 58.
61. See NPR, supra note 27, at 40.
62. See, e.g., id. at 40-41.
63. i. at 41.
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serve to reduce the number of warheads retained as a
geopolitical hedge, by helping to dissuade potential
competitors from believing they can permanently secure an
advantage by deploying new nuclear capabilities.64
The NPR goes on to characterize a robust, ongoing nuclear
weapons complex as a means of deterrence in a nuclear-weapons-
free world, should one ever be achieved: "[I]n a world with
complete nuclear disarmament, a robust intellectual and physical
capability would provide the ultimate insurance against nuclear
break-out by an aggressor."65 The scope of the physical projects it
envisions-such as the construction of a new uranium processing
facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge and a new Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos
National Laboratory66-will involve enormous expenditures, as
discussed below.
As referenced above, the NPR determines that the United
States will retain the "triad" of submarine-launched ballistic
missiles ("SLBM"), inter-continental ballistic missiles ("ICBM"),
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.67 For delivery of SLBMs, the
United States currently has fourteen nuclear-capable, Ohio-class
strategic submarines ("SSBNs"). Noting that the Ohio-class
submarines are old and that the first Ohio-class submarine
retirement is planned for 2027, the NPR concludes that the
United States needs to continue development of a follow-on to
this line of submarines: " [T] he Secretary of Defense has directed
the Navy to begin technology development of an SSBN
replacement."6 8 Similarly, regarding ICBMs, the NPR states that
" [t]he Department of Defense will continue the Minuteman III
Life Extension Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in
service to 2030, as mandated by Congress."69 The NPR goes on to
note, "Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM is not needed
for several years, studies to inform that decision are needed
now."70 As to heavy bombers, the NPR notes that both B-52Hs
and B-2s will be retained in nuclear roles (some B-52Hs will be
64. Id.
65. Id. at 42.
66. See id. at 42.
67. See id. at ix, 19.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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converted to a conventional-only role) and that "[t]he
Department of Defense (DoD) will invest more than $1 billion
over the next five years to support upgrades to the B-2 stealth
bomber."71
The Obama NPR makes similar provisions for "extend[ing]
the life of nuclear warheads":
The Administration will fully fund the ongoing LEP
[Life Extension Program] for the W-76 submarine-based
warhead for a fiscal year (FY) 2017 completion, and the full
scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb to
ensure first production begins in FY 2017.
The Nuclear Weapons Council will initiate a study in
2010 of LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead to be
conducted jointly by the National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Department of Defense. This study
will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of
using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in
order to reduce the number of warhead types.72
These plans are not presented in a contingent way to indicate
that the US may have to undertake such military projects and
expenses if certain milestones towards nuclear elimination
cannot be reached. Rather, the ongoing continuation of wide-
scale nuclear weapons capability is projected as an ongoing fact
of life.
The scope of the NPR's long-term commitment to nuclear
weapons can be seen from the dollars being committed. A "Fact
Sheet" released by the White House on November 17, 2010
discloses:
President Obama has made an extraordinary
commitment to ensure the modernization of our nuclear
infrastructure, which had been neglected for years before he
took office. Today, the Administration once again
demonstrates that commitment with the release of its plans
to invest more than $85 billion over the next decade to
modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons complex that supports
our deterrent. This represents a $4.1 billion increase over
the next five years relative to the plan provided to Congress
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 39.
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in May. This level of funding is unprecedented since the end
of the Cold War.73
The Obama Administration has also committed additional
billions over the next decade to modernize strategic nuclear
delivery systems:
In May, the Obama administration committed more than
$100 billion over the next decade to modernizing strategic
nuclear delivery systems. The Pentagon is maintaining and
replacing its strategic delivery systems, including complete
rebuilds of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile and Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile.
Minuteman can serve until 2030, and Trident is expected to
last until 2042. The service lives of Trident Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarines are being extended, and a new fleet of
submarines is under development at an expected cost of $85
billion. The B-2 "stealth" bomber is being upgraded at a cost
of $1 billion over the next 5 years. The Air Force is also
planning to replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile.74
These levels of expenditure and the NPR's enthusiastic
embrace of the modernization of the US nuclear capability seem,
on the ground, to project a strong belief in the legitimacy and
long-term viability of the established nuclear weapons regime,
albeit at lower numbers of weapons, resulting, at least in part,
from the greatly increased accuracy of delivery systems.75
73. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: An
Enduring Commitment to the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent (Nov. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/17/fact-sheet-enduring-
commitment-us-nuclear-deterrent
74. Tom Z. Collina & Daryl G. Kimball, New START Floor Debate: ACA Rebuttal to
Kyl's 14 Points, ARMS CONTROL NOW: THE BLOG OF THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Dec. 17,
2010), http://armscontrolnow.org/2010/12/17/aca-rebuttal-to-kyl%E2%80%99s-14-
points/
75. A 1991 UN study of nuclear weapons highlighted the relationship between
missile accuracy and the level of destructiveness needed for a particular mission:
Missile accuracy is usually given in terms of the circular error probable (CEP),
defined as the distance from an aiming point within which, on the average,
half the shots aimed at this point will fall. Using this concept, assessments of
the efficiency of various missile systems can be illustrated. For example, a 1 Mt
nuclear warhead may be needed in order to destroy a particular hardened
structure if the CEP of that nuclear weapon is 1 km. The same effect could
result from a 125 kt warhead with a 0.5 km CEP accuracy, or a 40 kt warhead
with a 0.33 km CEP. Thus, increased accuracy meant that smaller yield
warheads could replace high yield warheads as a threat to these types of
targets.
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The NPR also references that other states, including China
and Russia, are engaged in modernization projects.76 Most
conspicuously missing from the NPR, in describing these
programs for the wide-scale modernization and expansion of the
US nuclear weapons complex, is any suggestion to negotiate an
agreement with China, Russia, and other nuclear weapons states
to refrain from some of these huge commitments to whole new
generations of nuclear weapons. Such an effort at negotiated
restraint would seem to be a natural step if the United States is
indeed committed to the objective of nuclear elimination-and
would appear to be required by the NPT before such vast
modernization projects go forward.
J. No New Nuclear Warheads
The Obama NPR takes the position that the United States
will not develop new nuclear warheads, but will limit itself to the
refurbishment and reuse of existing warheads-and will not
permit replacement of warheads without Congressional approval:
The United States will not develop new nuclear
warheads. Life Extension Programs [LEP] will use only
nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and
will not support new military missions or provide for new
military capabilities.
The United States will study options for ensuring the
safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-
by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated
Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP
approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing
warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.
In any decision to proceed to engineering development
for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong
preference to options for refurbishment or reuse.
Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken
only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could
U.N. Secretary-General, General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear
Weapons: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 1 118, U.N. Doc. A/45/373 (Sept. 18, 1990).
76. See NPR, supra note 27, at 28.
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not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the
President and approved by Congress.77
This sounds like a positive development, but the scope of
the modernization projects the NPR supports seems so vast as to
raise questions about what distinguishes "new" from
"refurbished," "reused," or "replaced." Questions are also raised
by the NPR's statement that the Life Extension Programs "will
not support new military missions or provide for new military
capabilities." Reportedly, the LEP for the W76 is adding to its
capability to hit hard targets, and the modernization of the
delivery systems in some instances increase the weapons'
capability, such as the targeting and command and control of the
F-35.78
K. NPR's Justification for Nuclear Weapons Based on Demands of US
Allies
The NPR argues over and again that the United States has to
continue to maintain its nuclear weapons on a robust basis
because its allies and partners demand it, lest they develop their
own nuclear weapons:
By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and
reinforcing regional security architectures with missile
defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can
reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of
our security commitments to them and confirm that they do
not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.79
The NPR further states:
The potential for regional aggression by these states
raises challenges not only of deterrence, but also of
reassuring U.S. allies and partners. In the Cold War, our
allies sought assurance that they would remain safe in the
face of Soviet threats because the United States was
demonstrably committed to their security. Today's
environment is quite different. Some U.S. allies are
increasingly anxious about changes in the security
environment, including nuclear and missile proliferation,
77. Id. at xiv.
78. See Greg Mello, That Old Designing Fever, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 51, 52; see also Burroughs, supra note 54, at 5.
79. NPR, supra note 27, at vi.
OBAMA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
and desire reassurance that the United States will remain
committed to their security. A failure of reassurance could
lead to a decision by one or more non-nuclear states to seek
nuclear deterrents of their own, an outcome which could
contribute to an unraveling of the NPT regime and to a
greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use.80
This position of the NPR is written as if the United States has
no influence over the views of its allies and partners on the
legitimacy and utility of nuclear weapons. Nowhere does the NPR
express the view that nuclear weapons are legally, morally, or
pragmatically illegitimate, or propose an initiative whereby the
United States might seek to persuade its allies and partners of
such problems with the weapons. In fact, there are indications
that some major US allies, including Germany and Japan, have a
greater interest in nuclear disarmament than the Obama NPR
recognizes.81
L. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Obama NPR characterizes the NPT Article VI
obligation as being "to make progress towards nuclear
disarmament[,J "82 to "work towards disarmament[J "83 to "move
toward disarmament,"8 4 and "to pursue nuclear disarmament."8 5
Each of these formulations understates the scope of the
obligation. Article VI requires each state party to "pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament."86 Also, as noted, the ICJ concluded in the Nuclear
80. Id. at 4.
81. See, e.g., Ian Traynor, German Call to Shed Nuclear Arms, GUARDIAN (London),
Oct. 15, 2010, at 28 (reflecting Germany's support for nuclear disarmament); Ministry of
Foreign Aff. of Japan, Japan's Nat'l Statement at the Washington Nuclear Security
Summit (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.mofa.gojp/policy/un/disarmament/
arms/nuclear-security/20 1 0/national-statement.html (reflecting Japan's support for
nuclear disarmament); see also Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to
the United Nations, Joint Statements by Foreign Ministers on Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.netherlandsmission.org/
article.asp?articleref=AR00001019EN&categoryvalue=statements&subcategoryvalue=
2010.
82. NPR, supra note 27, at v.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 12.
86. See NPT, supra note 1, art. VI.
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Weapons advisory opinion that this is an obligation not just to
begin but also to "bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control."87 Thus, the obligation is not merely to
"work toward" nuclear disarmament but rather to engage in
good faith negotiations and actually achieve disarmament.
The NPR argues that the reductions it proposes in the role
and number of US nuclear weapons represent movement
towards nuclear disarmament and hence put the US in
compliance with the NPT.8 8 However, this position seems hardly
sustainable when the United States is ostensibly not willing to
even enter into negotiations for nuclear disarmament and is only
cutting back on the nuclear weapons it does not need, while
maintaining, developing, and modernizing the nuclear weapons
it believes it does need, spending hundreds of billions of dollars
for that purpose and for the long-term expansion and
maintenance of the physical and human infrastructure for its
nuclear weapons complex.
Ultimately, it is hard to see how the US can be in
compliance with its NPT obligations unless it is prepared to
negotiate nuclear disarmament-to actually sit down with the
interested parties and try in good faith to negotiate a nuclear
weapons convention or other approach to nuclear
disarmament-and to take the steps necessary to cause such
negotiations to take place.
No doubt, many of the overt steps the United States would
need to take, if it were genuinely committed to achieving nuclear
disarmament, would be the same as those set forth in the Obama
NPR. Arms-control steps limiting the role and numbers of
nuclear weapons certainly could make progress toward nuclear
disarmament. Nuclear disarmament would certainly be a process
that would involve many steps and take place over many years.
Yet arms control does not necessarily move toward nuclear
disarmament. It may just be arms control, an effort to cut back
the weapons and limit the risks. Absent a clear and genuine
process of nuclear disarmament-a process that the Obama NPR
87. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 1 105(2) (F) (July 8).
88. See NPR, supra note 27, at 6-7, 17.
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does not commit to creating-arms control, however laudable, is
merely arms control.
Quite the opposite of genuinely seeking abolition, the
Obama NPR commits to the indefinite maintenance and indeed
upgrading and expansion of the United States' nuclear weapons
program and espouses the legitimacy of the United States'
potential use of nuclear weapons whenever the United States, in
its subjective judgment, believes such use would serve its vital
interests or those of its partners and allies.
M. Abolition
In its section "Looking Ahead: Toward a World without
Nuclear Weapons," the Obama NPR sets forth the following
objective: "Set a course for the verified elimination of all nuclear
weapons and minimize risk of cheating and breakout, through
increasing transparency and investments in verification
technologies focused on nuclear warheads, rather than delivery
vehicles."89 The NPR, however, makes it clear that nuclear
elimination is not a key objective or concrete initiative. As noted,
the NPR is devoid of any suggestion that the United States-or
any other nuclear state-enter into negotiations for the
elimination of nuclear weapons. As discussed above, it focuses
heavily on the non-nuclear weapons states fulfilling their part of
the NPT's "grand bargain" and on numerous initiatives to deal
with possible efforts by non-nuclear weapons states to obtain
nuclear weapons, but it contains no plan or initiative for the
nuclear weapons states to actually negotiate disarmament.
The NPR's lack of commitment to negotiating nuclear
disarmament is evident from the language the document uses.
The elimination of nuclear weapons is described as "an
ambitious goal [that] could not be reached quickly-perhaps,
[Mr. Obama] said, not in his lifetime."90 It is characterized as an
"ultimate goal,"91 an effort to "eventually" eliminate nuclear
weapons "over time,"9 2 an objective "if international conditions
allow,"93 and as "the long-term goal of U.S. policy."94
89. Id. at 48.
90. Id. at iii.
91. Id. at xv-xvi, 1, 49.
92. Id. at 47.
a*3 8..
2011] 765
766 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:734
The Obama NPR set up onerous conditions to this long-
term goal of nuclear abolition:
The conditions that would ultimately permit the United
States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without
risking greater international instability and insecurity are
very demanding. Among those are the resolution of regional
disputes that can motivate rival states to acquire and
maintain nuclear weapons, success in halting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater transparency
into the programs and capabilities of key countries of
concern, verification methods and technologies capable of
detecting violations of disarmament obligations, and
enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter
such violations. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today.
But we can-and must-work actively to create those
conditions.95
Perhaps most striking is the condition concerning
"resolution of regional disputes." It seems on its face not only to
be unrealistic but also to have the situation exactly backwards. It
is because of regional and other disputes that threaten world
peace and security-such as those in the Middle East, India-
Pakistan, and North Korea-South Korea-that the elimination of
nuclear weapons is so important. Of the many that have been
recognized as unlawful under international law over hundreds
and even thousands of years, no other weapon has had its
unlawfulness be subject to the elimination of the bases for
conflict. This cynical reversal of the purported goal of
elimination seems but an extension of the Obama NPR's basic
attitude that the United States will cut back on nuclear weapons
that it does not need-so also, the United States will agree to the
elimination of all nuclear weapons once the risk of war has been
eliminated, and, until then, it will maintain whatever nuclear
weapons it feels, in its own unbridled judgment, it needs. The
NPR's purported promise of elimination "over time" is like a
toxic mortgage with the impossibility of the instrument hidden in
the fine print. The difficulties of proliferation, verification, and
enforcement-difficulties of the highest order-are challenging
94. Id.
95. Id. at 48-49; see also id. at xv.
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enough obstacles to achieving nuclear elimination without
adding the elimination of strife as a condition.
Also sobering is the Obama NPR's view of what nuclear
elimination, if ever achieved, would look like: it would not, in this
vision, be a world delivered from the threat of nuclear weapons,
but rather one in which states were spending billions of dollars
annually on inchoate nuclear weapons-nuclear weapons
complexes ready to spring into production upon perceived
provocation or a change of policy. In language quoted above with
reference to the NPR's plans for the reinvigoration and
modernization of the US nuclear weapons regime, the NPR
states, "[I]n a world with complete nuclear disarmament, a
robust intellectual and physical capability would provide the
ultimate insurance against nuclear break-out by an aggressor."96
N. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism and Proliferation
The Obama NPR states that the US approach to preventing
nuclear proliferation and terrorism includes three key elements:
First, we seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation
regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and
enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear
trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
without increasing proliferation risks. Second, we are
accelerating efforts to implement President Obama's
initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide
in four years.
And third, we are pursuing arms control efforts-
including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START), ratification and entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of
a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty-as a means of
strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international
support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-
proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials
worldwide.97
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id. at vi-vii.
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These are obviously significant and necessary steps. What is
missing, as noted above, is a concrete commitment to nuclear
abolition, an effort to engage other nuclear states in that
commitment, and concrete steps to conceptualizing and
implementing the actual process of abolition.
0. Significance of the United States' Univaled Conventional Military
Capabilities
The Obama NPR acknowledges the United States'
"unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities" and cites them
as a reason the United States is able to reduce its reliance on
nuclear weapons.98 Such a reduced reliance by the United States
is obviously positive. But beneath the surface of the NPR-and
not taken into consideration by the document-is the reality that
this US conventional weapons hegemony, standing alone,
renders the elimination of nuclear weapons much more
difficult-and perhaps impossible. Specifically, nuclear weapons
are the "great equalizer." States potentially adverse to the United
States that see themselves as substantially weaker in conventional
weapons may well feel that it is not a coincidence that the United
States, in its various military forays into combat in the post-World
War II era, has never initiated military conflict with a state that
had nuclear weapons. Such states may find it quite difficult to
forswear nuclear weapons absent some redressing of the balance
of conventional weapons capabilities.
There is a broader irony here. During the Cold War, the
United States, by contemporary accounts, was inferior to the
Soviet Union in conventional weapons-and hence relied heavily
on the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Now the situation is
reversed, and Russia is weaker in conventional weapons and
dependent on nuclear weapons. This hard reality reinforces the
sense that conventional weapons capabilities will need to be
addressed if nuclear abolition is to be achieved."9
98. Id. at v.
99. Article VI of the NPT spoke of general as well as nuclear disarmament: "Each of
the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control." NPT, supra note 1, art. VI.
OBAMA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
P. A Positive Note: The Establishment of a Comprehensive National
Research and Development Program to Foster Nuclear Elimination
The NPR says the Obama Administration would " [i]nitiate a
comprehensive national research and development program to
support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear
weapons, including expanded work on verification
technologies."100 This process seems strongly consistent with a
good faith effort by the United States to achieve the objective of
nuclear disarmament. The implementation of nuclear
elimination, under any circumstances, will be challenging and, at
best, take many decades to achieve. Obviously an enormous
amount of work will be needed to envision, test, and develop how
elimination might be achieved. The United States' experience
with the ongoing implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention may be instructive but will only be a beginning.101
Q. Role of Law/Rule of Law
Most striking in the Obama NPR's "thorough" review of US
nuclear policies and force structure is the absence of any
treatment of the subject of the legal requirements applicable to
the use and threat and use of nuclear weapons. The NPR is
written as if there are no issues under international law
surrounding the lawfulness of the use and threat of use of
nuclear weapons. The NPR gives the impression that the US
nuclear posture is fundamentally a pragmatic matter of what
weapons the United States wants for deterrence or actual use. In
reality, there is, as the United States has long recognized, a
robust body of international law applicable to the use and threat
of use of nuclear weapons-law that severely limits the
circumstances, if any, in which nuclear weapons might lawfully be
used or threatened. The only law the NPR overtly refers to is the
NPT, specifically the obligations imposed on nuclear and non-
nuclear states by that convention-and even there, as discussed
100. NPR, supra note 27, at 47.
101. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13 1993, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; see also CWC Treaty, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SECURYIY,
http://www.cwc.gov/cwc-treaty.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) (setting forth various
regulations, schedules, and other information as to the implementation by the United
States of its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention).
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above, the NPR substantially understates the legal obligations
undertaken by the nuclear weapons states by that convention.
There is one other area in which the NPR appears to be
reflecting a view of the requirements of international law
regarding the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. The NPR
states repeatedly that "the United States . . . would only consider
the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
partners."10 2 The use of the term "extreme circumstances" is
curious-and is possibly intended to invoke certain language
from the ICJ's 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. The ICJ
concluded in that case that the use of nuclear weapons is subject
to IHL and would generally be unlawful under such law but
found itself unable to decide whether or not the use of low-yield
nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances of self-defense could potentially comply with such
law. As to the latter point, the court stated:
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international
law viewed as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and
of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to
observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the
legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very
survival would be at stake.103
If the Obama NPR's use of the term "extreme
circumstances" is based on a characterization of the ICJ decision
as permitting the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances of self-defense, it is misplaced. The ICJ was explicit
that it was not determining that the use of nuclear weapons is
lawful in extreme circumstances of self-defense in which the very
survival of a state is at stake. It determined, quite differently, that
it was unable to reach a conclusion on this point.
In addition, while the language of the ICJ decision was
unclear at some points, the totality of the ICJ decision was clear
that a state's exercise of its right of self-defense, whether it be in
"extreme" or non-extreme self-defense, is subject to IHL. As the
ICJ put it, a state's exercise of the right of self-defense must
102. See NPR, supra note 27, at viii-ix, 16, 17.
103. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 1 97 (July 8).
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"conform[] to the fundamental principles of the law of armed
conflict regulating the conduct of hostilities."10 4
The ICJ further noted that a state's exercise of the right of
self-defense must also comply with international humanitarian
law. The court stated:
The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article
51 is subject to certain constraints. Some of these constraints
are inherent in the very concept of self-defence. Other
requirements are specified in Article 51.
The submission of the exercise of the right of self-
defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is
a rule of customary international law. As the Court stated in
the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America): there
is a "specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in
customary international law." This dual condition applies
equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of
force employed.
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself
exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all
circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is
proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be
lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed
conflict . . . .05
The NPR's failure to focus on the requirements of IHL and
more fully on the requirements of the NPT is lamentable not
only as an unfortunate abnegation of the rule of law, but also as a
significant lost opportunity. The use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons are so clearly and demonstrably unlawful under
international law that law offers perhaps the best prospect of
convincing the world community that such weapons need to be
banned and eliminated. There will always be political, strategic,
and military arguments that can be adduced in support of the
utility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in particular
104. Id. 91 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Written
Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom 1 3.44 (June 16, 1995), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8802.pdf).
105. Id. I1 40-42 (emphasis added) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 27)).
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situations. Hence, there will always be reasonable sounding
arguments for maintaining the nuclear weapons regime,
whatever the associated risks. But if the weapons are unlawful,
that is potentially a forceful and forward-looking basis for
elimination, whatever the putative utility of the weapons in some
particular situation. This can be seen from the integration into
consciousness of the unlawfulness of the use and threat of use of
chemical and biological weapons; this prohibition is basically
accepted without even considering the potential usefulness of
such weapons in a particular situation.
The fact that nuclear weapons could not be used in
deterrence if the use of such weapons was unlawful was
acknowledged by the United States in the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion. United States lawyer Michael J. Matheson, in
his oral argument to the court, stated:
[E]ach of the Permanent Members of the Security Council
has made an immense commitment of human and material
resources to acquire and maintain stocks of nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems, and many other States have
decided to rely for their security on these nuclear
capabilities. If these weapons could not lawfully be used in
individual or collective self-defence under any circumstances,
there would be no credible threat of such use in response to
aggression and deterrent policies would be futile and
meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible to separate the
policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of the means
of deterrence. Accordingly, any affirmation of a general
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons would be directly
contrary to one of the fundamental premises of the national
security policy of each of these many States.106
Nor was this a spontaneous or casual remark. The United
States stated in its memorandum to the ICJ:
It is well known that the Permanent Members of the
Security Council possess nuclear weapons and have
developed and deployed systems for their use in armed
conflict. These States would not have borne the expense and
effort of acquiring and maintaining these weapons and
delivery systems if they believed that the use of nuclear
weapons was generally prohibited. On the contrary, the
106. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Verbatim Record, 62-63 (Nov.
15, 1995, 10 a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5947.pdf.
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possible use of these weapons is an important factor in the
structure of their military establishments, the development
of their security doctrines and strategy, and their efforts to
prevent aggression and provide an essential element of the
exercise of their right of self-defense. 107
The Obama NPR leaves the United States with essentially its
current nuclear arsenal, subject to some cutbacks per New
START and, potentially, to the contemplated follow-up
negotiations to take place between Russia and the United States.
Review of the known effects of the nuclear weapons in that
arsenal reveals that the use and threat of use such weapons is
unlawful under IHL.108 Specifically, applying the legal
requirements of IHL-the rules of distinction, proportionality,
and necessity and the corollary requirement of controllability-
to the known facts of nuclear weapons, including such facts as
stated by various judges of the ICJ, it seems evident that nuclear
weapons cannot be used consistently with IHL.os
III. WHATA GENUINELY PRO-ABOLITION NUCLEAR POSTURE
REVIEW WOULD LOOK LIKE
The above discussion acknowledges the many positive arms
control initiatives of the Obama NPR but criticizes the NPR's
failure to establish nuclear disarmament as a concrete objective
and to initiate steps to conceptualize and move forward on the
process of disarmament in a timely manner. A genuinely pro-
abolition NPR would conceptualize its arms control and other
initiatives with reference to their potential contribution to
achieving abolition. A genuinely pro-abolition NPR would also
acknowledge-indeed, highlight-the applicable rules of
international law governing the use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons and integrate the requirements of such law into the
nuclear plans and policies it established. Most centrally, a
genuinely pro-abolition NPR would compellingly provide the
rationale-moral, practical, and legal-for abolition and
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Written Statement of the United
States, 14 (June 20, 1995), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf
(citing U.N. Secretary-General, General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on
Nuclear Weapons: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 11 44-81, U.N. Doc. A/45/373 (Sept. 18,
1990).
108. See CharlesJ. MoxleyJr. et al., supra note 32.
109. See id.
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acknowledge that nuclear weapons, rather than being a means to
security, have become the greatest threat to security, and that
deterrence, as stated by Messrs. Kissinger, Nunn, Perry, and
Schultz, has become "obsolete" and "decreasingly effective."
A. Contrast between the Obama NPR and the Action Plan of the NPT
Conference
As noted above, the Action Plan adopted by consensus, with
the support of the United States, as part of the Final Document
of the 2010 NPT Conference, recognizes the risks of nuclear
weapons and the NPT obligation of the nuclear weapons states to
disarm. The Conference provided, as "Action 1," that "[a]ll
States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible
with the [NPT] and the objective of achieving a world without
nuclear weapons."110 The Obama NPR's overall assertion of the
utility and legitimacy of the threat and use of nuclear weapons
and commitment to the long-term expansion and modernization
of the United States' nuclear weapons arsenal and program seem
wildly incompatible with this NPT commitment of the United
States.
B. A Dose of Realism Moderated by Vision
A genuine effort by the United States and other nuclear
weapons states to "operationalize" President Obama's vision of a
world without nuclear weapons would no doubt be difficult and
challenging-and would certainly not be assured of success.
What is certain is that, absent a serious effort to achieve this
fundamental alteration of the status quo, the risk of nuclear
disaster on what could be a cosmic scale remains.
CONCLUSION
With significant cut-backs, promises of more, and a
commitment to limiting nuclear weapons, the Obama NPR
presents a good Cold War, arms-control nuclear posture. As such,
it is a significant step forward from America's previous nuclear
posture. At the same time, this NPR continues the United States'
core commitment to nuclear weapons as essential to US national
110. Final Document, supra note 5, at 20.
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defense and the defense of its friends and allies: the United
States will retain nuclear weapons-as many of them as it thinks it
needs at any particular time-for the indefinite future. In the
process, it will spend hundreds of billions of dollars upgrading
and modernizing its nuclear arsenal for decades to come.
This is not a nuclear posture that moves towards abolition.
The NPR's unmistakable premise of the utility, legitimacy, and
effectiveness of these weapons is the very antithesis of a
commitment to their abolition. As long as this US nuclear policy
remains, there will be no nuclear abolition-and the continued
proliferation of nuclear weapons can be expected except to the
extent the United States or other states are able to stop it in
individual instances through pressure, threat, or force.
Profoundly missing in the Obama NPR is any recognition
that these weapons threaten human existence. The ultimate
premise of the posture is that a state may-without legal or moral
restraint-risk the annihilation of human life to foster its own
national objectives. Equally troubling is the Obama NPR's utter
failure to acknowledge, let alone consider, the requirements of
international law applicable to the use and threat of use of
nuclear weapons-requirements that the United States knows to
be legally binding and applicable to its nuclear posture,
including its day-to-day policy of deterrence. The Obama
Administration is continuing the monumental risk to human
health and survival that nuclear weapons represent.
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